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“In this 21st century, we should be long past the double-standard that 
allows men to age with gravitas while women are saddled with an 
expiration date.”1 
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Channel Over Age and Gender Bias, DEADLINE (June 19, 2019, 2:16 PM), https://deadline.c 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The best piece of advice I received when I began teaching law was to 
adopt Charlie Sullivan’s and Mike Zimmer’s casebook for my Employment 
Discrimination class.  Before I became a law professor, I had no clue how 
important choosing the right textbook is, not only for the students but for 
the teacher.  I also was unaware of how much I had to learn about a subject 
I thought I knew well.  I had been litigating employment discrimination 
cases for several years, but when I began teaching, I quickly learned how 
much I did not know.  Charlie’s and Mike’s casebook, through its 
organizational structure, its case selection and, importantly, its thoughtful 
and probing notes, gave me a deeper understanding of my field.  As did 
their scholarship.2 
I first met Charlie at the AALS annual meeting my first year in law 
teaching.  I got up the nerve to introduce myself (I was, and still am, a bit 
star-struck by Charlie), and was gratefully surprised by how kind and 
approachable he was.  He talked with me about my work in progress and 
made me feel like I belonged in this profession.  Later at the conference, he 
introduced me to Mike, and the three of us ended up sharing a taxi to the 
airport.  Best cab ride ever. 
From the day I met him, Charlie has encouraged, supported, and 
inspired me.  I have learned more about employment discrimination from 
Charlie Sullivan than from anyone else I have known, and he has 
influenced and shaped the way I (and my students) think about our area of 
the law. 
Later in my career, one of my proudest moments as a law professor 
was when Charlie called to invite me to join him and Mike as their co-
author on the casebook.  I am honored to participate in this symposium 
celebrating Charlie; he has impacted my professional life in a way few 
others have.  I am grateful to be his colleague and his friend. 
II.  THE TALE OF CHRISTINE CRAFT, OR “TOO OLD, TOO UGLY AND NOT 
DEFERENTIAL TO MEN”3 
An example of Charlie’s and Mike’s careful case selection was 
featuring, in early editions of the casebook, Craft v. Metromedia, Inc,.4  Set 
in the world of local television news, the Craft case involved a sex 
discrimination claim by Christine Craft, who had been demoted from her 
job as co-anchor to reporter based largely on her on-air appearance.  
 
 2  That Charlie continues to produce some of the most insightful and path breaking 
scholarship in our field inspires awe. 
 3  CHRISTINE CRAFT, TOO OLD, TOO UGLY AND NOT DEFERENTIAL TO MEN (1991). 
 4  Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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Reaction by focus groups to Craft’s appearance was “overwhelmingly 
negative,”5 and in response, the station, KMBC, instituted a “clothing 
calendar” for Craft that dictated what clothes she would wear and provided 
her with make-up tutorials.6  A follow-up telephone survey of randomly 
selected viewers, pursuing issues raised by the focus groups, asked 
participants to rank Craft against her female co-anchor competitors; almost 
thirty percent of the questions dealt with “‘good looks’ or the dress of and 
image of a ‘professional anchor woman.’”7  Craft did not fare well in 
comparison.  Indeed, the results were described as “devastating,” and when 
the survey results came in, Craft was demoted.8  According to Craft, the 
news director told her she was being reassigned “because the audience 
perceived her as too old, too unattractive, and not deferential enough to 
men.”9 
Craft’s sex discrimination claim did not contend that appearance was 
irrelevant to the job of being a television news anchor.  Rather, her 
contention was that appearance standards were more strictly applied to 
female, as opposed to male, on-air talent.  The district court rejected that 
contention, finding that KMBC was concerned with the appearance of all 
its on-air personnel, male and female, and had addressed individuals’ 
deficiencies as needed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed this finding.10  Craft 
further argued, however, that “even if KMBC was evenhanded in applying 
its appearance standards, the district court erred in failing to recognize that 
the standards themselves were discriminatory,”11 contending “she was 
forced to conform to a stereotypical image of how a woman anchor should 
appear.”12  And she claimed that KMBC had relied on customer preference 
to justify its discrimination against her.  The Eighth Circuit rejected these 
arguments as well.  An emphasis on feminine “‘softness’ and bows and 
 
 5  Id. at 1209 (internal citation omitted). 
 6  Id. at 1208–09. 
 7  Id. at 1209. 
 8  Id.  The news director “characterized the results of the research, in the language of 
the district court, as ‘devastating and unprecedented in the history of the consultants of 
Media Associates.’”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  Craft was reassigned to a position as a 
reporter at no loss of pay, a reassignment she refused.  Id.  Craft returned to her previous 
news station in California to work as a co-anchor.  Id.  Craft subsequently became a lawyer 
and also wrote a book about her experience.  See CRAFT, supra note 3.  
 9  Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209.  The news director “specifically denie[d] making such a 
statement, and the district court believed his version of the conversation.”  Id. (internal 
citation omitted).  Upholding this finding of fact, the Eighth Circuit stated, “The district 
court was in the best position to determine whether to believe Shannon [the news director] 
or Craft, and there are no circumstances suggesting any basis for finding clear error in the 
district court’s choice in favor of Shannon.”  Id. at 1212. 
 10  Id. at 1213–14. 
 11  Id. at 1214. 
 12  Id. 
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ruffles” were but incidental to the station’s legitimate interests, particularly 
given that “reasonable appearance requirements were ‘obviously critical’ to 
KMBC’s economic well-being.”13  Nor, said the appeals court, was the fact 
that Craft was meant to add “warmth and ‘comfortability’ to the newscast a 
reflection that the station was placing her in a stereotypical ‘female’ role 
secondary to her male co-anchor.”14  As for Craft’s allegation that she was 
specifically told she was being demoted because she was viewed by the 
audience as “too old, too ugly and not deferential enough to men[,]” the 
news director denied making the statement, and the district court resolved 
the credibility conflict in his favor.15 
The Craft case raised a number of interesting issues.  What should we 
make, if anything, of the fact that Craft had been hired to “soften” the 
newscast?  If femininity got her the job, should that preclude her objecting 
to being required to project a stereotypical feminine image?  Moreover, if 
the station were simply responding to viewer preferences and ratings, 
should it matter to the outcome of the case whether those preferences or 
ratings themselves were grounded in gender bias?16  Furthermore, could 
appearance be a BFOQ for a job such as television news anchor?17  Why 
didn’t the station mount a BFOQ defense, given that it certainly seemed to 
have relied on stereotypes of female appearance and demeanor?  Had this 
case been brought after Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,18 with its recognition 
that sex stereotyping can support a claim of sex discrimination, would the 
outcome have been different?  How far does or should the grooming code 
exception to Title VII’s disparate treatment theory extend?19  All of these, 
and more, were questions the Craft case allowed students to explore. 
Eventually, Craft was dropped as a main case.  Newer cases presented 
newer issues involving sex stereotyping, grooming codes, customer 
preference, and the BFOQ defense.  Perhaps, too, there was a feeling 
(maybe we should call it wishful thinking) that Craft was a relic from the 
past, and that employers in television news were now more enlightened, as 
were their viewers, and that a case such as Craft’s would not arise today.  
Would it were so. 
 
 13  Id. at 1215. 
 14  Id. at 1216. 
 15  Craft, 766 F.2d at 1212.  
 16  See infra notes 122–39 and accompanying text. 
 17  A BFOQ is a bona fide occupational qualification that serves as an affirmative 
defense to an intentional discrimination claim under Title VII and the ADEA.  For a 
discussion of the BFOQ defense, see infra notes 109–21 and accompanying text. 
 18  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 19  See infra notes 96–108 and accompanying text for a discussion of grooming codes 
and appearance standards. 
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III.  THE MORE THINGS CHANGE . . . “ALL YOU NEED TO DO IS TURN ON 
THE LOCAL NEWS.  IT OFTEN LOOKS LIKE TAKE YOUR DAUGHTER TO WORK 
DAY”20 
The past year or so has seen a spate of well-publicized claims by 
television news anchors from around the country.  The claims have been 
brought by women who are claiming their age, combined with their sex, led 
to their dismissals or demotions from their jobs in television news.21  There 
is the case of Nashville news anchor Demetria Kalodinos, fired from her 
job at age fifty-eight, after thirty-three years on the air.22  Her replacement 
was a thirty-two-year-old female.23  And news anchor Karen Fuller, fired at 
forty-seven, claimed her station, KCTV, had “an ‘age ceiling’ for its female 
anchors but not for its male anchors.”24  When discussing Fuller’s younger 
replacement, the station manager was alleged to have remarked, “She can 
 
 20  Clair Suddath, Beloved Nashville Anchor Sues Meredith for Age Discrimination, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2018, 11:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-1 
2-10/beloved-nashville-anchor-sues-meredith-for-age-discrimination (quoting Karen 
Fuller’s attorney, Pete Smith).  See also Dan Margolies, Former KCTV-5 Anchor’s Age 
Discrimination Lawsuit Can Proceed, Judge Rules, KCUR (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.kc 
ur.org/post/former-kctv-5-anchor-s-age-discrimination-lawsuit-can-proceed-judge-rules#stre 
am/0 (quoting attorney for plaintiff Karen Fuller, who sued her employer, KCTV for age 
and sex discrimination).  Fuller’s suit settled on undisclosed terms one month before trial 
was slated to begin.  See Dan Margolies, Former KCTV Anchor Karen Fuller Settles Her 
Discrimination Lawsuit Against Meredith Corp., KCUR (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.kcur. 
org/post/former-kctv-anchor-karen-fuller-settles-her-discrimination-lawsuit-against-meredi 
th-corp#stream/0.  
 21  The irony of my writing about this topic does not escape me.  My first job out of 
college was as a television news reporter.  After about one and a half years on the job, I was 
let go; the explanation given me by the news director was that I looked “too young” on 
camera to be taken seriously by viewers.  I always believed, however, that my dismissal had 
more to do with my refusal to sleep with the news director.  Sexual harassment in the 
television news industry is something else that does not seem to have gone away, as the 
allegations involving Roger Ailes, Matt Laurer, and  Les Moonves, for example, make clear, 
but discussion of sexual harassment claims in the television news industry is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
 22  As Ms. Kalodinos stated in an interview with the New York Times,  
My gender and my age stamped me with a bull’s-eye I couldn’t shed despite decades of 
dedication, journalism awards, public respect and popularity. . . .  At Meredith [the station’s 
owner], the message to women journalists is loud and clear: Don’t make trouble, don’t stick 
up for other women, and whatever you do, don’t get old.  
Steve Cavendish, The Fight to Be a Middle-Aged Female News Anchor, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/opinion/meredith-kalodimos-age-discrimin 
ation.html.  
 23  Suddath, supra note 20.  
 24  Margolies, Former KCTV-5 Anchor’s Age Discrimination Lawsuit Can Proceed, 
Judge Rules, supra note 20.  “Ms. Fuller’s suit alleged that removing older women from 
highly visible roles has been a problem at Meredith stations, with a set of seven female 
anchors in markets including Atlanta, Phoenix and St. Louis removed in a span of five years 
and replaced with younger women.”  Cavendish, supra note 22.  
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be cute and young but also able to dress up and be more serious and 
respectable . . . .  How will she age, I wonder?”25  Michele Gillen, former 
anchor and chief investigative reporter for CBS’s Miami affiliate last year 
sued for age and gender discrimination after she was removed as host from 
her public affairs program.26  Moreover, five female anchors recently sued 
NY1, claiming that after Charter Communications took over, it “blatantly 
marginalized them and cast them aside in favor of younger women and 
men.”27  “We are fighting for any woman who has reached a certain age 
and has been intentionally marginalized, passed-over and deemed less 
relevant because of her age.”28  The situation in television news and 
advertising is so pronounced that the Association of National Advertisers 
has launched a #SeeHer initiative aimed at ensuring that the women we see 
on air reflect women in our society at large.29 
Discussions of these recent claims inevitably lead to a renewed 
discussion in the media of the Craft case, which still remains the most 
prominent case involving discrimination against a television news anchor.  
Almost forty years after Craft was demoted, and thirty-five years after the 
appellate court rejected her discrimination claim, it is striking how similar 
the newsroom environment appears.30  Craft’s former lawyer, when asked 
about the most recent claim involving a Kansas City television station, 
noted the lack of progress that has been made in the years since Craft’s suit 
was brought, observing that “[i]t is interesting that things seem not to 
change much for females.”31  Prominent plaintiffs’ attorney Ed Buckley, 
 
 25  Margolies, Former KCTV-5 Anchor’s Age Discrimination Lawsuit Can Proceed, 
Judge Rules, supra note 20. 
 26  See Johnny Diaz, Former CBS Miami Anchor Michele Gillen Files Age and Gender 
Discrimination Suit, SOUTH FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.sun-
sentinel.com/news/florida/fl-ne-michelle-gillen-sues-wfor-age-discrimination-20180918-
story.html.  
 27  See Erik Larson, N.Y. News Anchors Sue Charter for Age, Gender Discrimination, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 19, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
report/n-y-news-anchors-sue-charter-for-age-gender-discrimination.  
 28  Evans, supra note 1 (quoting open letter from plaintiffs to the public). 
 29  See Cavendish, supra note 22. 
 30   
Aging in television newsrooms has always been a problem, particularly for women. For 
every Judy Woodruff or Andrea Mitchell who has remained on the air into her 70s, many 
more hit the ceiling that Ms. Fuller and Ms. Kalodimos have found, in spite of 
performance. . . .  Local television presents a particularly tough challenge: Ratings pressure 
is ever-present, consultants are a constant and management turnover can be high—neither of 
the general managers who terminated Ms. Fuller or Ms. Kalodimos, for instance, is still at 
their station.  And yet the cultural influence of these stations, for all that they’re viewed as 
an outdated medium, remains real: Almost 40 percent of Americans watch local TV news, 
more than watch cable or broadcast. 
Id.  
 31  Margolies, Former KCTV-5 Anchor’s Age Discrimination Lawsuit Can Proceed, 
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who has litigated numerous discrimination suits against television stations, 
had a similar view: “I’ve been doing this work more than [thirty] years, and 
I can’t tell you much has changed,” Buckley said, noting that TV stations 
regularly fire based on age.32  He cited to what he termed as “coded 
comments,” such as a need for “fresher talent” or a description of a young 
female as someone who “pops.”33  “That means, boy, she’s young and sexy 
and hot.”34 
IV. SEX PLUS AGE OR AGE PLUS SEX?  “IN OCCUPATIONS WHERE 
APPEARANCE IS BELIEVED TO BE IMPORTANT, THE TREATMENT OF OLDER 
WOMEN IS MUCH WORSE THAN THAT OF OLDER MEN OR YOUNGER 
WOMEN.”35 
That aging takes a harder toll on women in the workplace than on men 
is a truth almost universally acknowledged.36  Moreover, women in 
television news are hardly the only women to see their careers, or career 
prospects, diminish with advancing years.37  But the treatment of these 
women, who we welcome into our homes and watch each evening as they 
age on air, is a particularly powerful example of how our society treats 
older women.38  If these women, in prominent and prestigious positions, 
 
Judge Rules, supra note 20. 
 32  Suddath, supra note 20. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Nicole B. Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 95 (2003). 
 36  Susan Bisom-Rapp & Malcom Sargeant, Its Complicated: Age, Gender and Lifetime 
Discrimination Against Working Women—the United States and the U.K. as Examples, 22 
ELDER L.J. 1, 21 (2014) (“Older women, however, suffer from the disadvantage of the 
combination of stereotyping based on age and gender, both of which can negatively affect 
them in the workplace.”); David Neumark, How Can We Know if There Is Discrimination in 
Hiring?, ECONOFACT (Oct. 27, 2018), https://econofact.org/how-can-we-know-if-there-is-
discrimination-in-hiring (noting that experiential research shows that older women 
experience more age discrimination than older men); Porter, supra note 35 (discussing how 
appearance related norms affect women, particularly aging women, in the workplace and 
while noting that age “has not truly affected the power or status of older men”).  According 
to Bisom-Rapp and Sargeant, research shows three predominant ways older women are 
stereotyped—women are seen as aging earlier, their appearance is viewed more harshly than 
older men’s and “compared to older men, aging women are seen as ‘less competent, 
intelligent and wise.’”  They are, however, seen as more nurturing, sensitive and warmer 
than older men.  See Bisom-Rapp & Sargeant, supra note 36, at 28.  
 37  Porter, supra note 35, at 95, 100–01 (noting that appearance matters outside 
television news as “one survey found appearance to be the single most important factor in 
employee selection for a wide variety of jobs” and that this is particularly true for women, 
for whom “appearance and ‘the beauty myth’ really are a major cause of discrimination 
against older women,” even in jobs where appearance could not be a primary function of the 
job). 
 38  Cavendish, supra note 22 (“An unappreciated aspect of sexism in the workplace is 
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can be cast aside when they grow older, what does that portend for the rest 
of us?39  Or is there something about television news, a visual medium after 
all, that gives employers in this field more room to take appearance into 
account, even if doing so adversely impacts women? 
Federal law prohibits discrimination in employment, and television 
news anchors and reporters are unquestionably employees.  Title VII 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,40 and the ADEA prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of age against workers age forty or above.41  
Accordingly, firing or demoting women because of their sex or because of 
their age (if forty or older) is unlawful, unless the employer can 
successfully assert a BFOQ.42 
But what happens when the claim is that it is not sex alone, nor age 
alone, but the combination of sex plus age or age plus sex that has caused 
the adverse action to occur?43  This contention was missing in the Craft 
case.  Despite the alleged references to her being “too old,” Craft did not 
bring an age discrimination claim.  Why not?  Because she was only thirty-
seven at the time of her demotion, and the ADEA’s protections apply only 
to those age forty or above.44 
How should the law treat claims such as these?  Can a sex plus age 
claim succeed under Title VII?  Can an age plus sex claim succeed under 
the ADEA?  Or must these women sue separately under each statute, 
creating the risk that each claim may fail based on the presence of the 
alternative motivation under the other statute? 
 
age discrimination, and it operates in many places.  But one of the places where it’s most 
visible—where we can all #SeeHer getting aged out—is in TV news.”). 
 39  Bisom-Rapp & Sargeant, supra note 36, at 28 (“Discussions of how aging affects 
women typically reference the problem of appearance.  In societies that prize female youth 
and beauty, signs of aging in women lead to their devaluation and what has been termed 
‘gender ageism.’”); see also Porter, supra note 35, at 107 (pointing to literature supporting 
the fact “that it is far more common for older women to be the victims of appearance related 
discrimination that for older men or younger women to fall victim to this phenomenon.”).  
 40  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2) (2018). 
 41  29 U.S.C. § 623 (2018). 
 42  See discussion infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
BFOQ affirmative defense. 
 43  Patti Buchman, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anchorwomen 
on the Basis of Age Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 191 (1985) (contending 
that emphasizing youthful appearance for women to a greater degree than men runs afoul of 
Title VII and asserting, “There is evidence that network executives and station managers 
regard women over the age of forty as ‘too old’ and ‘too unattractive’ to anchor the news.  
Whereas for male anchors ‘gray hair and frown lines are wrinkles and [considered] marks of 
distinction, . . . [f]or women they’re the kiss of death.’”). 
 44  Should we consider it progress that today’s women anchors have been able to retain 
their jobs into their forties and fifties, something that would have been virtually unheard of 
at the time Craft brought her claim?  Of course not.  
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A. Title VII and Sex Plus Age Claims 
Christine Craft brought a Title VII disparate treatment claim against 
KMBC and its parent company, and disparate treatment claims are alleged 
in the more recent claims being brought by female anchors as well.45  
“Disparate treatment,” the Supreme Court tells us: 
is the most easily understood type of discrimination.  The 
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others 
because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.  
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in 
some cases be inferred from the mere fact of differences in 
treatment.46 
The Court was discussing Title VII, but the disparate treatment theory 
applies under the ADEA as well. 
Disparate treatment, despite the Supreme Court’s description of it, has 
proved neither simple nor easily understood.  In fact, it is quite 
complicated, as the cases discussed herein demonstrate.  But the gist of the 
disparate treatment theory is this: if the plaintiff proves the protected 
characteristic actually motivated the decisionmaker, then she generally 
prevails.47  Discriminatory intent or motive is not the equivalent of hatred, 
ill will or animus.  Intent is present when the employer takes the action 
because of the plaintiff’s sex, for example, even if the action were taken for 
ostensibly benign purposes.48  If a woman is intentionally treated 
differently than she would have been treated were she a man, even if the 
employer claims he has good business reasons for treating her differently, a 
disparate treatment claim is present.49 
Suppose, though, that it is not simply a woman’s sex, but her sex plus 
some other characteristic, which has caused the employer to take action 
against her.  Can she successfully bring a claim? 
 
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta,50 the employer refused to hire women 
 
 45  See, e.g., Torre, et al v. Charter Communications, Inc. d/b/a/Spectrum, Case 1:19-cv-
05708 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 46  Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
 47  I say generally because there is an affirmative defense, known as the BFOQ, 
discussed infra.  Moreover, there is a judicially created exception for dress and grooming 
codes, discussed infra at notes 96–108.  Finally, there is the question of motivating factor 
versus but for causation, also discussed infra at notes 66–68.   
 48  See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (sex-
specific policy constituted disparate treatment, whether or not employer’s motive was 
beneficent). 
 49  We will put aside for the moment the role customer preference may play in these 
claims.  This issue is discussed infra notes 122–39 and accompanying text. 
 50  Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
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with pre-school age children, while imposing no such limitation on the 
hiring of men.  The Court held that this “sex plus” discrimination ran afoul 
of the statute.51  Even though not all women were subject to the hiring 
ban,52 those with young children were being treated differently than men 
with young children.  This “sex plus” discrimination constituted disparate 
treatment within the meaning of the statute.53 
Courts have gone on to recognize other sex plus claims, almost always 
when the “plus” involves an immutable characteristic or fundamental 
right,54  and the courts also have recognized sex plus race claims under 
Title VII.55  As one commentator recently asserted, “As courts have 
developed the doctrine, the additional ‘plus’ factor in a sex-plus case must 
pertain to either to an immutable characteristic or a fundamental right.”56  
But, importantly, the claims have been recognized under Title VII, whether 
the plus is school age children, marital status, race or religion.  Recognizing 
“sex plus” claims means that women can allege sex discrimination “even 
when not all members of a disfavored class are discriminated against.”57  
Or as Professor Marc McAllister correctly describes the sex plus theory, 
“an employer in a sex-plus case cannot justify its discriminatory actions 
towards a particular subgroup of women simply by pointing to its favorable 
treatment of other women outside that particular subgroup.”58 
But what if the sex plus claim under Title VII is sex plus age?  Here, 
the question becomes more difficult.  One commentator, Professor Nicole 
Porter, asserts that despite the protections of Title VII and the ADEA: 
[A]n older woman cannot bring a claim based on the fact that she 
 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. at 543 (noting that the majority of the employer’s workforce was female). 
 53  Id. 
 54  See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 
2004) (alleged discrimination against women with young children); Sprogis v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (no marriage rule for stewardesses violates 
statute).   
 55  See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994); Marc Chase McAllister, Extending 
the Sex-Plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age Discrimination Claims Involving Multiple 
Discriminatory Motives, 60 B.C.L. REV. 469, 483 n.102 (collecting cases). 
 56  McAllister, supra note 55, at 477 (emphasis added); see also Buchman, supra note 
43, at 198, 201 (questioning whether age-related appearance is immutable, like race, or 
mutable, like weight, and contending that youthful appearance is either immutable or semi-
immutable). 
 57  Back, 365 F.3d at 118.   
 58  McAllister, supra note 55, at 478; see also Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The point behind the establishment of the sex-plus discrimination theory 
is to allow Title VII plaintiffs to survive summary judgment when the defendant employer 
does not discriminate against all members of the sex.  Thus, the . . . cases have not created a 
new remedy, but instead have closed a loophole through which defendant employers could 
escape Title VII liability.”). 
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feels she was discriminated against because she is an older 
woman.  In other words, her claim must be brought either on the 
basis of her sex or on the basis of her age, but not on the basis of 
both her sex and age combined.59 
As she states, using an example especially pertinent here, “[d]espite our 
laws prohibiting age discrimination and sex discrimination, one only has to 
look as far as the television in one’s home to see an example of how the 
merging point of sexism and ageism has really affected older women in a 
very unique, and unfortunately, very negative way.”60  As she observes, 
protection under Title VII or the ADEA for older women as such has 
proven elusive. 
Professor McAllister also acknowledges the difficulties posed by such 
claims under either Title VII or the ADEA, noting: 
[S]ome courts have rejected attempts to claim subgroup 
discrimination under Title VII by older male or female 
employees, reasoning that because the ADEA does not permit a 
combined age-plus-sex discrimination claim, plaintiffs should 
not be allowed to recast such a claim as a sex plus age claim 
under Title VII.61 
He goes on to state, however, that some courts have recognized these 
62claims under Title VII,  a result for which both he and other commentators 
63advocate.  
Given that other “sex plus” claims are widely recognized under Title 
VII, why are sex plus age claims so problematic?  The reasons are varied.  
For one thing, unlike many of the sex plus cases brought under Title VII, 
the plus involves neither another protected category under Title VII (such 
 
 59  Porter, supra note 35, at 79; see also Katlyn J. Lynch, Sex-Plus-Age Discrimination: 
State Law Saves the Day for Older Women, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 151 (2015) 
(noting that no federal appellate court has adopted, and some have explicitly rejected, Title 
VII sex plus age claims); Bisom-Rapp & Sargeant, supra note 36, at 31 (“[L]egal doctrine is 
in general not hospitable to claims of intersectional discrimination . . . .”); Joanne Song 
McLaughlin, Limited Legal Recourse for Older Women’s Intersectional Discrimination 
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 26 ELDER L.J. 287, 315 (2019) (noting 
that the ADEA and Title VII are ineffective in protecting older women from discrimination).   
 60  Porter, supra note 35, at 94. 
 61  McAllister, supra note 55, at 486. 
 62  It is fair to say, however, that very few cases have discussed the issue in any detail.  
See Porter, supra note 35, at 87 n.68; McAllister, supra note 55, at 488.  At least two 
circuits did consider the question but did not decide whether such a claim was viable, 
finding it unnecessary, under the facts presented, to do so.  See Best v. Johnson, 714 F. 
App’x 404 (5th Cir. 2018); Sherman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 188 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 63  See Sabina F. Crocette, Considering Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination Claims by 
Women: Examining Approaches to Pleading and Analysis—A Pragmatic Model, 28 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 115 (1998); Porter, supra note 35, at 102–11; Lynch, supra note 59, at 151; 
Buchman, supra note 43, at 195. 
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as race) nor a characteristic that correlates with gender stereotypes (such as 
being a working mother with young children).64  More importantly, Title 
VII and the ADEA are separate statutes and have different proof structures, 
and this difference has led some courts to find that sex plus age claims are 
not available under Title VII.65 
66Importantly, Title VII permits mixed motive claims.   The ADEA, 
according to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial 
67Services, Inc.,  does not.  Title VII allows plaintiffs to prevail by showing 
that sex was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision-making, even if 
other factors also motivated the decision.  The ADEA, however, requires 
that age be the “but for” cause of the at-issue decision.  Although it need 
not be the sole factor, age must be the “but for” cause.  Thus, allowing sex 
plus age claims under Title VII, in the view of these courts, 
would be tantamount to allowing plaintiff to argue age 
discrimination in the context of a mixed-motive theory of 
discrimination.  Such a result stands in direct opposition to the 
language of the ADEA and the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gross.  In addition, it would provide plaintiffs an end-run around 
the heightened standards set forth by Congress under the 
ADEA.68 
Or as the district court stated in Best v. Johnson, “[b]ecause Congress 
chose to protect the two characteristics in completely separate statutory 
schemes, allowing Best to pursue her ‘gender plus age’ claim at trial would 
constitute improper judicial legislation.  Courts have declined to recognize 
such ‘plus’ claims on this basis alone.”69  Older women, said the Best court, 
 
 64  See Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Cent. Sch. Dist., 10-CV-845, 2015 WL 13574291 
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015); see also McAllister, supra note 55, at 488–90 (discussing 
Bauers-Toy). 
 65  See Best v. Johnson, 1:15-CV-00086-NBB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147819 (N.D. 
Miss. Aug. 30, 2018).  See also McAllister, supra note 55, at 485–86; Lynch, supra note 59, 
at 154.  Similar issues may arise for sex plus claims involving other statutes, such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.  For a discussion of sex plus claims involving sex and 
disability, see Jennifer Bennett Shinall, The Substantially Impaired Sex: Uncovering the 
Gendered Nature of Disability Discrimination, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1099 (2017). 
 66  42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(m) (2018); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989). 
 67  557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 68  Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *6; see also, McAllister, supra note 55, at 488–
90 (discussing Bauers-Toy).   
 69  Best v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CV-00086-NBB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147819, at *4; 
see also Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *6 (“While the Court is cognizant of plaintiff’s 
valid argument that an individual could be treated unlawfully as a result of both age and 
gender, it is not within the Court’s purview to create a cause of action under Title VII which 
does not apparently exist.”); Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-cv-
01294-RM-NYW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *8 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018) (rejecting 
sex plus age claim: “[S]hould plaintiffs’ standalone age discrimination fail under a narrower 
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are not a protected class for purposes of Title VII.70 
A few district courts, however, have permitted such claims.  One of, if 
not the first to do so, was Arnett v. Aspin,71 a district court opinion.  In 
allowing the claim to proceed, the Arnett court relied upon the sex plus 
theory recognized in Phillips v. Martin Marietta and its progeny.72  
Regardless of the subclass, the court said, Title VII, as understood by the 
sex plus theory, does not permit employers to discriminate against some 
73women so long as they do not discrimination against all women.   In the 
court’s view, that the sex plus claim involved protections provided by two 
different statutes was a distinction without a difference. Arnett, however, 
was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross.  Does or should 
that matter? 
Should sex plus age claims be recognized today under Title VII?  
Both Professors Porter and McAllister argue that they should be.  As 
Professor Porter explains, it is insufficiently protective of older women to 
relegate them to bringing separate claims under Title VII and the ADEA: 
when an older woman is replaced by a younger woman, while older men 
retain their jobs, she is unlikely to be successful under either the ADEA or 
Title VII in cases involving circumstantial evidence of discrimination.74  As 
she explains, her Title VII sex discrimination claim would likely fail 
because she was replaced by a woman.75  Her age discrimination claim 
 
scope of liability, plaintiffs would be able to [fall back] on their gender plus age claim under 
a broader scope of liability.  The Court will not allow such an attempt to work-around 
statutory dictates.”). 
 70  Best, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147819, at *5. 
 71  846 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  According to Professor Porter, Arnett was the 
only court, as of 2003, to have “actually discussed and decided the issue of whether the law 
should recognize a sex plus age theory of discrimination.  Other courts have given it only 
cursory treatment.”  Porter, supra note 35, at n.68. 
 72  Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238–40. 
 73  Id. at 1240. 
 74  In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Supreme Court 
established the elements of a prima facie case for plaintiffs, which, once established, shifted 
to defendant the burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
challenged action.  While circuits have interpreted the elements of the test differently, the 
general requirements include: (1) the plaintiff was within the protected class; (2) the 
plaintiff had met objective qualifications or other benchmarks in job performance; (3) the 
plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred 
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.  Some circuits have 
required a particular showing of disparate treatment through comparators to meet the prima 
facie burden.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 942 F.3d 329, 331 (6th Cir. 
2019); Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc).  McDonnell 
Douglas was a Title VII case; the Supreme Court has never formally adopted this test in the 
ADEA context.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 n.2. (2009). 
 75  Porter, supra note 35, at 105–06. 
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would likely fail because older men were retained.76  “Even with the very 
strong evidence that the older woman was being discriminated against 
because she is an older woman, the plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims 
would both fail if analyzed separately,” Professor Porter asserts, since in 
each claim there would be no comparator outside the protected class treated 
more favorably.77 
Porter contends that a straightforward application of the sex plus 
theory, as occurred in Arnett, should be applicable to sex plus age claims; 
Using this rule . . . an older woman should be able to prove that, 
had she been an older man, she would have been treated 
differently, even if there were plenty of younger women who 
were treated better than she was.  Simply following precedent 
leads us to the conclusion that the sex plus age theory should be 
recognized.78 
But Professor Porter’s article was written before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gross.  Professor McAllister’s, on the other hand, was written 
in a post-Gross landscape, and he, too, concludes that sex plus age claims 
should be recognized under Title VII.79  He does so after acknowledging 
the conflict between Gross on the one hand and Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
on the other.80  But the “most logical” way to resolve the conflict, he says, 
is to focus simply on the Title VII claim, which permits sex plus claims, 
without regard to whether an “age plus” claim  may or may not be available 
under the ADEA.81  And he agrees with Professor Porter that “the biases, 
 
 76  Professor Porter notes that in disparate treatment cases involving circumstantial 
evidence, plaintiff must show, as part of her prima facie case, that comparable employees 
not in the protected group were treated more favorably.  Porter, supra note 35, at 105. 
 77  Id.  See also Crocette, supra note 63, at 143 (claims under the separate statutes allow 
employers to focus on younger women and older men to defeat claims at summary judgment 
stage); Kate Sablosky Elengold, Clustered Bias, 96 N.C.L. REV. 457, 466–69 (2018) 
(making a similar point for sex plus race claims).  For a discussion of comparator proof in 
discrimination cases, see Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving 
Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191 (2009). 
 78  Porter, supra note 35, at 108. 
 79  McAllister, supra note 55, at 473. 
 80  McAllister, supra note 55, at 501 (“On the one hand, if age-plus-sex claims under the 
ADEA are precluded by Gross’s conception of but-for causation—under which an ADEA 
plaintiff must prove that was ‘the reason’ for the adverse employment action as opposed to 
‘simply a motivating factor’—then sex-plus-age discrimination claims under Title VII also 
should be precluded because permitting such claims would allow a plaintiff to prevail upon 
a showing of two discriminatory motives, thereby circumventing the causation principles 
espoused in Gross.  On the other hand, if the Title VII sex-plus doctrine is applied faithfully, 
then sex-plus-age claims should be permitted, given that the well-established sex-plus 
doctrine, flowing from Phillips, permits such claims when an employer discriminates 
against a subgroup of male or female employees on the basis of an immutable characteristic, 
which would naturally encompass a person’s age.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 81  McAllister, supra note 55, at 501. 
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prejudices and stereotypes associated with both ‘ageism’ and ‘sexism’ 
become worse when coupled together, becoming for some women a 
‘double hurdle’ of sex discrimination and age bias.’”82  That the plus factor 
involves an immutable characteristic protected by another statute is, in his 
mind, as in the mind of the Arnett court, a distinction without a difference 
as far as Title VII is concerned.83 
This view appears correct.  Discrimination against a subgroup of 
women, because they are women, runs afoul of Title VII, even if other (or 
even most) women are not victims of discrimination.84  Whether the claim 
would succeed under the ADEA should have no bearing on its validity 
under Title VII.85 
Importantly, though, the courts have not widely embraced this view.  
And their unwillingness to do so goes beyond whether a successful prima 
facie case can be brought.  Courts are refusing to permit a sex plus age 
theory to proceed as outside the protections afforded by Title VII.86 
B.  The ADEA and Age Plus Sex Claims 
If sex plus age claims are allowed under Title VII, does it follow that 
age plus sex claims should be allowed under the ADEA?  Not necessarily.  
Even the district court judge who authored the Arnett opinion rejected an 
age plus theory under the ADEA.87 
Unlike under Title VII, where sex plus claims have been expressly 
recognized by the Supreme Court, the Court has not squarely addressed an 
age plus claim.  Most courts rejecting “age plus” claims have done so in 
reliance on Gross, finding that it would be inconsistent for a plaintiff to 
 
 82  McAllister, supra note 55, at 503 (citations omitted).   
 83  McAllister, supra note 55, at 502. 
 84  See Elengold, supra note 77, at 498–99 (advocating for a “cluster framework, rather 
than a “sex plus” framework for intersectional claims).  “Sex plus,” she claims, is confusing 
and fundamentally flawed because intersectionality is “not an additive experience.”  Id. at 
498.  Instead,  
the cluster framework specifically defines sex discrimination to include the categorization, 
stereotyping, and subjugation of particular subgroups of women . . . and treats 
discrimination against a subset of women as ‘pure’ sex discrimination—no plus needed . . . . 
If a subgroup of women is treated differently because they are women, that is sex 
discrimination.  
Id. at 499. 
 85  One commentator, who also agrees these claims should be recognized under Title 
VII, relying on Phillips v. Martin Marietta and its progeny, points out that even if courts 
reject such claims under Title VII, state law may provide protection, as a number of states 
outlaw sex and age discrimination in the same statute.  See Lynch, supra note 59.  See also 
McLaughlin, supra note 59, at 308–12. 
 86  See supra notes 69–70. 
 87  Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (refusing to recognize 
a claim based on age plus disability). 
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claim her age was the “but for”cause of the adverse action while also 
claiming the action was based on her gender.88  However, a handful of 
courts have allowed “age plus” claims to proceed, reasoning that if sex plus 
claims are valid under Title VII, then “age plus” claims should be viable 
under the ADEA.89  They also have recognized that the “but for” causation 
standard adopted in Gross for the ADEA is not a sole cause standard.  The 
“but for” causation standard may be satisfied, even if other factors, such as 
sex, were also implicated in the decision.90 
Recall that at the time Phillips v. Martin Marietta was decided, “but 
for” causation was the causal standard under Title VII, as well.  That 
causation standard did not preclude the Court from recognizing that 
discrimination against only a subgroup of the protected class was 
nonetheless discrimination within the meaning of the statute.91  
Accordingly, Gross should not be seen as a barrier to an “age plus” claim, 
including an “age plus sex” claim. 
Whether a plaintiff may successfully bring a sex plus age claim under 
Title VII or an age plus sex claim under the ADEA, however, is admittedly 
unclear.  The handful of courts that have addressed the issue have divided 
on the viability of such claims.  And bringing the claims separately, as a 
sex discrimination claim under Title VII and/or as an age discrimination 
claim under the ADEA, using a circumstantial evidence approach runs the 
very real risk that the claims will fail.  A woman who loses her job to 
another woman or an older worker who is let go while other older workers 
are retained may often find it difficult to establish a prima facie case under 
either statute, regardless of the causation standard used.92 
 
 
 88  See Famighette v. Rose, 2:17-cv-2553 (DRH)(ARL), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74484, 
at *14 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2018); see also McAlllister, supra note 55, at 493–97 (collecting 
cases). 
 89  McAllister, supra note 55, at 497–99 (collecting cases).  But see McLaughlin, supra 
note 59, at 290 (“The ADEA has never recognized this intersectionality of discrimination.”).  
 90  Even the dissenters in Price Waterhouse understood that but for causation allowed 
for other motivations to be present; it simply was plaintiffs’ burden to show that sex was the 
but for cause of the challenged decision.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
282–84 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 91  See McAllister, supra note 55, at 505 (recognizing this point).  He also points to the 
fact that the ADEA is not a sole cause statute and further argues that while Gross rejected 
mixed motives claims involving both lawful and unlawful motives, here both reasons are 
unlawful, and but for causation principles do not preclude claims involving multiple illegal 
motives.  For these reasons, Professor McAllister contends age plus sex claims should be 
permitted, but he also calls for an amendment to the ADEA adding motivating factor 
language to clarify that age plus claims should be permitted when multiple illegal 
motivations are present.  Id. at 503–08. 
 92  See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
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V.  APPEARANCE BASED EXCEPTIONS TO DISPARATE TREATMENT 
THEORY; OR, “(S)HE’S GOT A GREAT FACE FOR RADIO”93 
Leaving aside the difficulties, discussed above, inherent in bringing an 
intersectional claim based on sex plus age, other potential obstacles loom 
for older female anchors.  Television, after all, is a visual medium, and the 
question becomes whether the employer could justify its disparate 
treatment of older women under either a grooming code, a BFOQ or a 
customer preference exception. 
Facially discriminatory policies, or direct evidence of discriminatory 
motive, are the relatively easy disparate treatment claims.  Direct evidence 
consists of statements by the decision maker, made in reference to the 
employment decision at issue, that facially demonstrate the prohibited 
bias.94  Were a station manager, for example, to say it was firing its news 
anchor because she was a woman, we would not be left to wonder about 
why she was fired.  We know why.  If the trier of fact determines that the 
statement was made and that it accurately reflected the decision maker’s 
motivation, intentional discrimination is established.  In the Craft case, for 
example, had the trial court believed, as Craft claimed, that the station 
manager had told Craft she was being demoted because she was “too old, 
too unattractive and not deferential enough to men,” that would have been 
direct evidence of discrimination, and the result in the case would 
presumably have been different.95 
When a facially discriminatory policy or other direct evidence of 
discrimination is present and credited, the question then turns to whether 
the employer has a valid defense.  That is, unless the claim involves a dress 
or grooming code, as in Craft. 
A.  Dress and Grooming Codes 
One significant exception to disparate treatment theory, and one front 
and center in the Christine Craft case, is the judicially-created exception for 
dress and grooming codes.  Different grooming codes or appearance 
standards for men and women have routinely been upheld by the courts, 
despite being facially discriminatory.96  An employer may permit women to 
 
 93  A remark my former news director was fond of making about other on-air talent in 
the market. 
 94  For a discussion of what constitutes direct evidence, see CHARLES A. SULLIVAN AND 
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 74, n.5 
(Wolters Kluwer, 9th ed.  2017). 
 95  But see Best v. Johnson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147819, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 
2018) (stating that older women are not a protected class under Title VII).  Under that 
reasoning, even direct evidence of discrimination would not suffice. 
 96  See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc). 
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wear their hair long while requiring men to wear theirs short,97 and it may 
insist that women wear makeup,98 or that men wear ties.99  So long as the 
requirements are not deemed more onerous for one gender than for the 
other, courts have viewed sex-differentiated grooming and appearances 
standards as essentially too de minimis to violate the statute.100  As the 
Ninth Circuit put it, “Grooming standards that appropriately differentiate 
between the genders are not facially discriminatory.”101  That, of course, is 
incorrect.  These policies are facially discriminatory.  But they nonetheless, 
despite enormous critical commentary to the contrary,102 have been deemed 
outside the reach of Title VII.  Separate but equal is the currently accepted 
touchstone vis a vis grooming and appearance codes. 
Do dress and grooming codes play into and reinforce gender 
stereotypes?  Indeed they do.  But to date that has not stopped courts from 
permitting employers to enforce them.  In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating 
Company, Inc., the court distinguished gender-specific grooming codes 
from the sex stereotyping at work in Price Waterhouse.103  In Price 
Waterhouse, the sex stereotyping created a catch-22 for Ann Hopkins—out 
of a job if she conformed to sex stereotypes and out of a job if she did not.  
No such catch-22 was present at the casino, said the Jespersen court.104  
And it rejected the argument that Harrah’s requirement that female 
bartenders wear makeup impermissibly perpetuated the stereotype that 
women, but not men, must be sexually attractive.105  Adopting Jespersen’s 
argument, the court essentially conceded, would wipe out most gender-
specific dress and grooming codes, something the court was not prepared to 
do.106 
Recall that in the Craft case, the question was not whether the station 
could insist that men and women dress differently.  The question was 
 
 97  Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087–88 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 98  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113. 
 99  Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 100  Courts have rejected the argument that these grooming codes constitute 
impermissible sex plus discrimination.  See McAllister, supra note 55, at 485. 
 101  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109–10. 
 102  See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Wilig, Another Hair Piece, Exploring New Strands of 
Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010); Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of 
Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 467 (2007). 
 103  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111–13. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. at 1109-11. 
 106  Currently pending before the Supreme Court is Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17-
1618, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2927 (U.S., Apr. 22, 2019) and its companion cases, in which the 
Court is considering whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or 
transgender status is prohibited by Title VII.  How the Court rules in those cases could well 
impact the question of sex stereotyping and gender specific dress and grooming codes. 
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whether the grooming standards for women were more onerous or were 
being applied more rigorously to women than to men.  Craft lost on this 
question of fact, just as Darlene Jespersen did decades later.107  The more 
recent cases being brought by older female anchors also do not take aim at 
the existence of separate dress and grooming codes for women and men per 
se.  Rather, as in Craft, the claim is that stations hold women to higher and 
more demanding appearance standards, standards that celebrate youth and 
beauty in women, while permitting men to age with dignity on the air.108 
An interesting twist in these recent cases is the insertion of age into 
the equation.  Well-groomed, professionally attired and, yes, attractive 
women are being pushed aside, so the allegations go, in favor of younger, 
more attractive women, while male counterparts suffer no such fate.  Could 
a station defend these claims by openly claiming that youth and beauty is 
essential for its female, but not male, anchors? 
B.  BFOQs and Television News 
The factual finding that appearance standards were not more 
demanding or applied more harshly to Craft than to her male counterparts 
is questionable at best.109  And when one watches television news today, it 
is hard not to conclude that for women, being relatively young and 
attractive remains the coin of the realm at the anchor desk (or even in the 
field).  If so, why do stations not simply assert a BFOQ?  Why do they not 
just admit that appearance matters and that, as the rankings show, it matters 
more for women than for men?  There are two reasons, one legal and one 
practical.  Legally, an appearance based BFOQ is essentially dead in the 
water.110 Practically, no news director worth his salt would let his station 
assert a BFOQ defense.111 
 
 107  See Emily Gold Waldman, The Preferred Preferences in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 97 N.C. L. REV. 91, 105–06 (2018) (“[C]ourts have applied the equal 
burdens test very loosely, allowing employers to defer to customer preferences that are in 
reality more burdensome on females than males,” calling the Craft case “a blatant example 
of this.”). 
 108  Joanne Bal, Proving Appearance-Related Sex Discrimination in Television News: A 
Disparate Impact Theory, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 211, 211 (“Although both male and female 
anchorpersons must meet substantial image requirements, anchorwomen are generally 
forced to conform to a much narrower and more demanding ideal of youth and beauty.”).  
See also Buchman, supra note 43, at 191.  In other words, assuming it is permissible for 
stations to insist on a youthful on-air appearance, they may not apply that standard 
disparately to men and women.  Id. at 199. 
 109  See Waldman, supra note 107, at 127–28 (“Both the Craft and Jespersen courts 
explicitly minimized the differential burdens that the hair and makeup expectations had on 
female employees, insisting that they were roughly equal to those imposed on male 
employees, despite significant evidence to the contrary.”). 
 110  See infra notes 112–20 and accompanying text. 
 111  See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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Both Title VII and the ADEA permit employers to facially 
discriminate on the basis of sex or age when sex or age “is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
112that particular business or enterprise.”   The BFOQ is an affirmative 
defense to disparate treatment claims, and it has been construed very 
narrowly by the courts.  Two prongs must be met.  First, the aspect of the 
job for which sex or age is claimed to be necessary must go to the essence 
113of the employer’s business.   To put it another way, what is the central 
mission of the business, and does the employer need to discriminate in 
employing people for the job in question in order to further that central 
mission?  It is not enough to show that an employer will make more money 
if it discriminates or that its intentional discrimination is a product of its 
customers’ preferences. 
For example, a BFOQ claim asserted by Southwest Airlines that it 
needed to hire only women as flight attendants because it had marketed 
itself as a flying cocktail lounge, and that its customers, primarily men, 
wanted attractive women serving them drinks in the air, was firmly 
114rejected.   The essence of an airline’s business is the safe transportation of 
115passengers, not selling sexiness in the air.  Thus, requiring that flight 
attendants be women would not go to the essence of the airline’s 
116business.   Nor could a battery-making plant insist that only infertile 
117women work in its manufacturing jobs.   The essence of Johnson 
Controls’ business was making batteries, and fertile women can make 
batteries as well as fertile men, even if the battery-making process posed a 
risk to a developing fetus.  Thus, no BFOQ was present. 
Second, even if the essence of the business test is satisfied, the 
employer must show that either all or substantially all members of the 
excluded group cannot perform the job or that it is impossible or 
impractical to deal with the excluded group on an individual basis.118  For 
example, the safe transportation of passengers is the essence of an airline’s 
business, and thus it may insist that its pilots be healthy and not at risk of a 
 
 112   42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(e); 29 U.S.C.§ 623(f)(1). 
 113  See Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1999). 
 114  Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981).  See also 
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 115  “[S]ex does not become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit 
female sexuality as a marketing tool . . . .”  Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 303. 
 116  The Southwest Airlines court distinguished airlines from strip clubs, where selling 
sex is the essence of the business.  Id. at 301–02.  A strip club hiring topless waitresses 
would be different from an airline and could insist on hiring women.  But what about a 
restaurant such as Hooters?  Can it insist that those serving its chicken wings and beer be 
sexy women?   
 117  Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991). 
 118  Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414–16 (1985). 
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heart attack or stroke.  But it may not use age as a proxy for health; rather, 
it can administer physicals to its pilots to determine who does or does not 
present a risk to the airline’s passengers. 
Understood in this way, it is easy to see how a BFOQ defense would 
fail if asserted in the context of television news.119  Yes, television is a 
visual medium, but the essence of the business is informing the public by 
delivering the news.  Men and women, young and old, can do that.  
Insisting that female anchors be attractive younger women goes no more to 
the essence of the news business than it did to Southwest Airlines’ safe 
transportation of its passengers.120  Moreover, even if the essence of the 
business test were somehow met, it would be neither impracticable nor 
impossible to make individual determinations about which women could 
meet the demands, rather than using age as a proxy. 
Perhaps a recognition that a BFOQ defense was unwinnable is what 
kept KMBC and other stations from raising it.  But at the time the Craft 
case was brought, the stringency of the BFOQ defense was not so firmly 
established.  So why was the defense not asserted?  Most likely, it was 
because the credibility of television as a news-gathering and reporting 
organization undoubtedly was and is on the minds of news departments and 
121their stations.   For a news department to insist that the essence of its 
business is not delivering the news but instead is delivering the news in a 
sexually appealing way would be a step too far for even the most 
entertainment-minded news directors.  Stations and networks pride 
themselves on the integrity of their news organizations; asserting that they 
are all about appearance as opposed to substance would be at odds with the 
credibility they seek with their viewers.  So stations and networks are 
unlikely to assert BFOQ defenses, and even were they to be asserted, courts 
are unlikely to accept them. . 
C.  Customer Preference and Television News 
Which brings us to the customer preference defense.  Assuming that 
viewers do judge women’s appearance more stringently than men’s and do 
take that into account in choosing which channel to watch, are employers 
forbidden from factoring those preferences into their employment 
 
 119  See Buchman, supra note 43Error! Bookmark not defined., at 205–06 (discussing 
the BFOQ defense in the context of television news).  
 120  Buchman, supra note 43, at 206.  See also Leslie S. Gielow, Sex Discrimination in 
Newscasting, 84 MICH. L. REV. 443, 466 (1985). 
 121  I suspect television reporters and anchors, even today, still harbor a bit of an 
inferiority complex as compared to their print brethren.  Newspaper reporters have a 
credibility in the hard journalism field that television reporters are often perceived as 
lacking.  Notice, for example, how often reporters from the New York Times and 
Washington Post appear as guests on CNN and MSNBC.  
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decisions?122  Could, or should, customer preference somehow form a 
defense to claims such as these? 
As mentioned above, customer preference has not been found 
sufficient for satisfaction of a BFOQ.  That an employer may make money 
by catering to its customers’ discriminatory preferences is no defense to a 
disparate treatment claim is a well-established tenet of disparate treatment 
theory.123  Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified this approach 
by amending Title VII to assert that business necessity is not a defense to a 
disparate treatment claim.124 
And yet.125  While employers may not defend against disparate 
treatment claims by acknowledging they intentionally discriminated but did 
so only at the behest of their customers, what happens when an employer 
acts on the basis of customer feedback that is itself the product of bias?  
More concretely, could a station fire a news anchor based on poor ratings, 
even if those ratings are themselves influenced by customer bias?126  The 
answer to this last question is far from certain. 
What does seem well-established is that customer preference is no 
defense to an employer’s own intentional discrimination.127  For example, 
an employer’s refusal to hire a woman for a job because of a concern that 
customers would not accept her in that role is still discrimination because 
of sex.  Had KMBC refused to hire a woman for an anchor role because she 
was a woman, it would be liable for sex discrimination, even if it did so 
 
 122  And according to the consultant in the Craft case, they do.  “[V]iewers—particularly 
other women—criticize women more severely than men for their appearance on camera and 
that women’s dress is more complex and demanding because ‘society has made it that 
way.’”  Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1214 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 123  See Waldman, supra note 107, at 93 (“A basic tenet of employment discrimination 
law is that customer preferences generally cannot justify discriminatory treatment by 
employers.”).  See Buchman, supra note 43, at 203–04 (showing a station’s argument that it 
would lose revenue if forced to keep older women anchors on the air is not a defense to a 
disparate treatment claim). 
 124  42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(2) (2018). 
 125  Professor Waldman’s article, supra note 107, described the various ways that 
customer preferences, despite the received wisdom to the contrary, in fact are taken into 
account by the courts.  She points to privacy based BFOQs, gender specific appearance 
requirements, business necessity defenses, and reasonable accommodations as collective 
examples of situations where customer preferences are used to defend against discrimination 
claims.  Waldman, supra note 107, at 97–123. 
 126  In the Craft case, the district court concluded that KMBC had “reasonably relied on 
the survey results as the basis for the personnel change.”  766 F.2d at 1210.  The appellate 
court affirmed that finding as not clearly erroneous.  Id. 
 127  See Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased 
Customer Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2196 (2018), 
(discussing judicial rejection of the customer preference defense); Gielow, supra note 120, 
at 443 (“Under Title VII . . ., customer preference is generally not a justification for sexually 
discriminatory employment decisions.”). 
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based on a concern that its viewers prefer male anchors.128 
But what if a news station (or other employer) makes an employment 
decision based on customer feedback?  If that feedback is openly biased, as 
it was in the Craft case, and if the employer is aware it is biased, holding 
the employer liable for acting upon it is not too much of a reach.129  There 
seems appreciably little difference between an employer who refuses to 
hire a female because he believes his customer will react adversely to a 
woman and an employer who knowingly fires the woman because his 
customers do.130  An employer’s conscious reliance on openly 
discriminatory feedback seems well within the reach of the statute. 
But, as Professor Dallan Flake asserts, “employers’ use of biased 
customer feedback to make employment decisions has gone largely 
unchecked,”131 noting “the courts have not directly addressed employers’ 
use of discriminatory customer feedback.”132  And the problem is 
particularly difficult when the feedback, while rooted in bias, implicit or 
otherwise,133 is not openly so.  As Professor Deborah Brake observes, 
 
 128  There were strong suggestions in the Craft litigation that Craft had been hired 
because she was a woman.  The station perceived a need to “soften” its male anchor with a 
female presence, and other stations in the market had gone with male/female anchor teams.  
Craft, 766 F.2d at 1208.  Assuming Craft got the job because she was a woman, would that 
stop her from claiming discrimination when she was later removed from the job?  No.  That 
she has benefitted from discrimination in the past does not preclude her from claiming 
discrimination in the present. 
 129  Flake, supra note 127, at 2196 (asserting that when feedback is intentionally biased 
and employer knows and uses it anyway, it “seems clear that in such cases the employer 
could—and should—be liable.”); Gielow, supra note 120, at 457 (stating that the Craft court 
“failed to consider whether the survey itself was sex biased, or whether the viewers brought 
sexual stereotypes to the viewings and thereby tainted the outcome of an otherwise sex-
neutral survey.”).  See also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419–22 (2011) (endorsing 
the “cat’s paw” theory of liability for discrimination claims). 
 130  There may be a narrow exception in cases involving privacy or safety, where 
customer preference arguments are essentially accepted as BFOQs.  The Court in Johnson 
Controls, however, did not reach the question of privacy-based BFOQs.  Int’l Union v. 
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 206, n.4 (1991).  
 131  Flake, supra note 127, at 2170–71.  See Buchman, supra note 43, at 210 
(“Apparently, ratings and audience research indicate that television audiences prefer to have 
their news delivered by attractive young anchorwomen, and thus their use by the television 
news industry in personnel decisionmaking has had an adverse impact on older women 
seeking to secure or retain anchor positions.”); Gielow, supra note 120, at 444 (“The public, 
according to many media personnel, evaluates female newscasters by different criteria from 
those used to judge their male counterparts.  In response to perceived public expectations, 
networks treat them differently as well.”). 
 132  Flake, supra note 127, at 2190.  See also Gielow, supra note 120, at 447 (contending 
that “viewer surveys almost always reflect sexual stereotypes that are impermissible under 
title VII . . . and . . . such surveys should be presumptively inadmissible as evidence to rebut 
a claim of sex discrimination.”). 
 133  There has long been a debate over whether disparate treatment theory reaches what is 
often termed as “implicit” or “cognitive” bias.  For a discussion of cognitive bias and its role 
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courts seem to be “increasingly wedded to a conception of the disparate 
treatment claim as predicated on the decision maker’s conscious reliance 
on a discriminatory reason.”134  If the employer is unaware that the 
customer feedback, or ratings in the case of television news, are the product 
of bias, then holding the employer liable for intentional discrimination is, 
quite frankly, unlikely.  As Professor Flake observes, “Can it really be said 
that an employer intentionally discriminates when it factors into an 
employment decision facially neutral feedback that is tainted by hidden 
bias that only a skilled social scientist could detect?”135 
That women are frequently rated lower than their male counterparts is 
no secret; female professors, female judges, even female orchestra 
performers often come up short in ratings as compared to men.136  
Nonetheless, when an employer relies on those rankings, particularly when 
they are facially neutral, a finding of intentional discrimination will be hard 
to come by. 
Of course, this gives employers little incentive to look behind the face 
of the ratings or customer feedback to see if they may be the product of 
bias; indeed, it encourages employers to do the opposite.137  Even if it 
suspects its viewers may be reacting adversely to an older woman vis-á-vis 
an older man or a younger woman because she is an older woman, so long 
as its decision is based on the ratings themselves, a liability finding is 
unlikely.  As Professor Flake observes, neither the disparate treatment nor 
 
in disparate treatment theory, including citation to the numerous articles on the topic, see 
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 8–10 (9th ed. 2017). 
 134  Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From 
Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 572 
(2017).  See Flake, supra note 127(quoting Brake). 
 135  Flake, supra note 127, at 2195–96.  Well, yes, it could, if one endorses a causal 
approach to disparate treatment.  If the employee loses her job because she is a woman, even 
if the bias prompting it is implicit, then she has been treated differently because of her sex.  
See generally Rebeca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: 
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decisionmaking?, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001) 
(advocating a causation-based approach to intentional discrimination).  As noted above, 
however, courts have generally insisted on a conscious decision to take sex or age into 
account.  Even the Price Waterhouse plurality described the motive inquiry in the following 
terms:  
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if 
we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we 
received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee 
was a woman.  
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).  
 136  Flake, supra note 127, at 2188.  This often is ascribed to implicit or cognitive bias.  
See SULLIVAN & ZIMMER, supra note 133. 
 137  Flake, supra note 127, at 2195–96.  
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the disparate impact138 analytical framework “is fully equipped to handle 
customer feedback discrimination claims and, in fact, have made such 
claims virtually unwinnable.”139 
VI.  A WORD ABOUT DISPARATE IMPACT 
Up to this point, we have  not discussed the disparate impact theory of 
discrimination. Both Title VII140 and the ADEA141 embrace disparate 
impact claims.  Unlike disparate treatment, which, as we have seen, 
requires a finding of intentional discrimination, disparate impact does not.  
Rather, when a facially neutral policy or criterion adversely impacts a 
protected class, then liability may exist under either Title VII or the ADEA. 
For example, if an employer requires its workers to pass a test in order 
to be hired, that requirement is facially neutral.  Moreover, the employer 
may have adopted the requirement with no intent to discriminate but rather 
in an effort to achieve a well-trained workforce.  Nonetheless, if the 
requirement screens out more black than white, or more female than male, 
or more older than younger, employees, the policy would have a disparate 
impact on black people, women or older workers. 
In the context of the present discussion, could a station’s use of 
ratings or customer feedback, a facially neutral practice, form the basis for 
a disparate impact claim?  Would today’s older female anchors have a 
greater likelihood of success if they pursue relief under a disparate impact 
theory? 
It is doubtful.142  While identifying the particular practice or practices 
causing the impact (ratings and/or viewer surveys) may not be difficult,143 
impact must still be shown.  This is usually understood to require a 
statistical showing of the challenged practice’s impact on the protected 
group.  When employment decisions affect only one or a handful of people, 
 
 138  Disparate impact claims are discussed infra at notes 140–53 and accompanying text. 
 139  Flake, supra note 127, at 2173.  Flake advocates a negligence-based approach that 
would hold employers liable if they knew or should have known the feedback was biased 
and that considers whether the employer acted reasonably in response by taking appropriate 
preventive or corrective measures.   
 140  The Supreme Court recognized disparate impact theory under Title VII in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  Congress codified disparate impact theory in 
Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending Title VII to expressly authorize 
disparate impact claims.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018). 
 141  Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 142  But see Bal, supra note 108, at 212 (contending that disparate impact theory “may 
provide a more successful means by which anchorwomen can prove unlawful, appearance-
related discrimination than disparate treatment claims,” when stations rely on viewer 
surveys and other forms of market research). 
 143  Disparate impact theory, under both Title VII and the ADEA, requires the plaintiff to 
identify the particular practice or practices causing the impact.  
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establishing impact on the protected group can be difficult, if not 
impossible, when the number of people subject to the particular practices is 
quite small.144  While an individual likely may bring an impact claim, it is 
still a statistically-based, group-based claim.145  And building such a 
statistical case becomes even more difficult when the allegation is that the 
practice impacts not all women or all persons over forty but only women of 
a certain age.146  Must impact be shown on women as a whole as opposed 
to on a subset of women?147  Must impact be shown on all workers age 
forty or above, as opposed to a subset of older workers?148  And, of course, 
there is the complication of intersectionality when the disparate impact 
structure varies between Title VII and the ADEA.  Could a disparate 
impact claim be brought under Title VII when the impact falls on a group 
defined by sex plus age, rather than on sex or age alone?149 
Moreover, once impact is shown, employers have a defense under 
either Title VII or the ADEA.  Under Title VII, if the employer can show 
the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity, the impact claim is defeated, unless the 
 
 144  Flake, supra note 127, at 2210 (“A final problem with the disparate impact 
framework [in customer feedback cases] is that establishing a statistically significant 
adverse impact almost always requires that a sufficiently large and diverse population be 
affected by the challenged practice.  Indeed, courts have routinely held that an adverse effect 
on a single or a few employees does not create a prima facie case of disparate impact as a 
matter of law.” (footnotes omitted)).  See also Bal, supra note 108, at 230 (acknowledging 
the difficulty of showing impact because of the small number of employment decisions 
involved).  But see Buchman, supra note 43, at 210 (contending that research shows ratings 
have an adverse impact on older women anchors generally).  
 145  But see Michael J. Zimmer, Individual Disparate Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning 
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 473 (1999) (arguing the plain 
language of the statute would allow an impact claim upon a plaintiff’s showing that (1) the 
employer took adverse action based on an employment practice; (2) an alternative practice 
exists that would serve the employer’s needs without adversely impacting the plaintiff; and 
(3) the employer refused to adopt the practice).  
 146  See Martha Chamallas, Exploring the Entire Spectrum of Disparate Treatment Under 
Title VII: Rules Governing Primarily Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 50, n.263 (“In a 
disparate impact challenge, however, marshalling convincing evidence that the standard has 
an adverse impact on women as a group may be very difficult, especially when the 
challenged standard is as difficult to measure as physical attractiveness.  Essentially, the 
plaintiff would attempt to show that more women than men would likely be excluded from 
the qualified applicant pool, given the defendant’s measure of attractiveness.”). 
 147  See Thompson v. Miss. State Pers. Bd., 674 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Miss. 1987) 
(rejecting impact claim for women over forty).  
 148  Marc Chase McAllister, Subgroup Analysis in Disparate Impact Age Discrimination 
Cases: Striking the Appropriate Balance Through Age Cutoffs, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1073, 1090 
(2019) (noting that “courts are split regarding whether subgroups of employees in the 
ADEA’s 40-and-over protected class may claim disparate impact discrimination.”). 
 149  See Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-cv-01294-RM-NYW, 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018) (rejecting disparate impact claim 
based on sex plus age). 
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plaintiff can demonstrate there is a less discriminatory alternative.150  Under 
the ADEA, the employer’s burden is even lighter.  It need only show the 
impact causing practice is a reasonable factor other than age.151  Basing an 
employment decision on ratings or customer feedback, assuming such 
feedback is facially neutral, would most likely satisfy the employer’s 
burden under either statute.152  Rankings are the coin of the realm in the 
television industry, and thus reliance on them would more likely than not 
be viewed as a business necessity and/or a reasonable factor other than 
age.153 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Decades after Christine Craft lost her job as a television news anchor, 
a similar fate has befallen a number of other women, who, despite (or 
perhaps because of) their years of experience on the air are being pushed 
aside for younger, more attractive women.  Meanwhile, their middle aged 
and older male counterparts continue to deliver the news. 
The plight of these high-profile women shows how inadequate our 
anti-discrimination laws and proof frameworks are in protecting older 
women against discrimination.  It is not just beauty and youth that fade as 
women age; their jobs do, too.  If courts are unwilling to view older women 
as a protected subgroup under a “sex plus” or “age plus” theory, then it will 
be difficult for women of a certain age to prevail in their employment 
discrimination suits. 
These cases also show the hollowness of the accepted maxim that 
employers cannot intentionally discriminate because it is good for business.  
Whether it is courts’ unwillingness to acknowledge the unequal appearance 
standards men and women are held to on the air, and/or their willingness to 
permit employers to rely on viewer preferences when making employment 
decisions about on air talent, courts are permitting employers to treat older 
 
 150  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). 
 151  Smith v.City of  Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 152  See Flake, supra note 127, at 2210 (asserting that customer satisfaction is likely be 
viewed as a business necessity).  See also Waldman, supra note 107, at 96 (acknowledging 
that it is unclear whether a customer preference could satisfy either the business necessity 
defense under Title VII or the Reasonable Factor Other Than Age defense under the ADEA.  
But appearance-based preferences, she says, “intuitively strike courts as reasonable and 
natural, both because they do not seem invidiously discriminatory and because they align 
with ingrained social conventions and norms.”).   
 153  But see Buchman, supra note 43, at 212–14 (contending that ratings would not 
constitute business necessity since they do not measure the anchor’s ability to report 
“intelligently and articulately,” and thus would not be job-related for the position); Bal, 
supra note 108, at 224–26 (contending that employers would need to prove the business 
necessity of the viewer surveys, including professional validation under the Uniform 
Guidelines of Employee Selection Procedures).   
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women differently, and less favorably, than their younger female or older 
male counterparts.  Women anchors, it seems, do come with an expiration 
date.  And our federal anti-discrimination statutes, as they are being 
interpreted and applied, are letting it happen. 
 
